I'm fairly new to c and I'm reading a book regarding Software Vulnerabilities and I came across this buffer overflow sample, it mentions that this can cause a buffer overflow. I am trying to determine how this is the case.
int handle_query_string(char *query_string)
{
struct keyval *qstring_values, *ent;
char buf[1024];
if(!query_string) {
return 0;
}
qstring_values = split_keyvalue_pairs(query_string);
if((ent = find_entry(qstring_values, "mode")) != NULL) {
sprintf(buf, "MODE=%s", ent->value);
putenv(buf);
}
}
I am paying close attention to this block of code because this appears to be where the buffer overflow is caused.
if((ent = find_entry(qstring_values, "mode")) != NULL)
{
sprintf(buf, "MODE=%s", ent->value);
putenv(buf);
}
I think here is it, because your buf is only 1024 and because ent->value can have more than 1024, then this may overflow.
sprintf(buf, "MODE=%s", ent->value);
But depends of implementations of split_keyvalue_pairs(query_string). If this function already checks the value and threat it (which I doubt).
klutt provided a good fix for the problem in a previous answer, so I'll try to go a bit more specific and in-depth on the exact nature of the overflow in your code.
char buf[1024];
This line allocates 1024 bytes on the stack, addressed by the pointer named buf. The big problem here is that it is on the stack. If you dynamically allocate using malloc (or my favorite: calloc), it will be on the heap. The location doesn't necessarily prevent or fix an overflow. But it can change the effect. Right above (give or take some bytes) this space on the stack would be the return address from the function, and an overflow can change that causing the program to redirect when it returns.
sprintf(buf, "MODE=%s", ent->value);
This line is what actually performs the overflow. sprintf = "string print format." This means that the destination is a string (char *), and you are printing a formatted string. It doesn't care about the length, it will just take the starting memory address of the destination string, and keep writing until it has finished. If there's more than 1024 characters to be written (in this case), then it will go past the end of your buffer and overflow into other parts of memory. The solution is to use the function snprint instead. The "n" tells you that it will limit the amount to be written to the destination, and avoid an overflow.
The ultimate thing to understand is that a "buffer" does not actually exist. It's simply not a thing. It is a concept we use to order the area in memory, but the computer has no idea what a buffer is, where it starts, or where it ends. So in writing, the computer doesn't really care if it is inside or outside of the buffer, and doesn't know where to stop writing. So, we need to tell it very explicitly how far it is allowed to write, or it will just keep writing.
A very big thing here is that you passed a pointer to a local variable to putenv. The buffer will cease to exist when handle_query_string returns. After that it will contain garbage variables. Note that what putenv does require that the string passed to it remains unchanged for the rest of the program. From the documentation for putenv (emphasis mine):
int putenv(char *string);
The putenv() function adds or changes the value of environment variables. The argument string is of the form name=value. If name does not already exist in the environment, then string is added to the environment. If name does exist, then the value of name in the environment is changed to value. The string pointed to by string becomes part of the environment, so altering the string changes the environment.
This can be corrected by using dynamic allocation. char *buf = malloc(1024) instead of char buf[1024]
Another thing is that sprintf(buf, "MODE=%s", ent->value); might overflow. That would happen if the string ent->value is too long. A solution there is to use snprintf instead.
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "MODE=%s", ent->value);
This prevents overflow, but it might still cause problems, because if ent->value is too big to fit in buf, then buf will for obvious reasons not contain the full string.
Here is a way to rectify both issues:
int handle_query_string(char *query_string)
{
struct keyval *qstring_values, *ent;
char *buf = NULL;
if(!query_string)
return 0;
qstring_values = split_keyvalue_pairs(query_string);
if((ent = find_entry(qstring_values, "mode")) != NULL)
{
// Make sure that the buffer is big enough instead of using
// a fixed size. The +5 on size is for "MODE=" and +1 is
// for the string terminator
const char[] format_string = "MODE=%s";
const size_t size = strlen(ent->value) + 5 + 1;
buf = malloc(size);
// Always check malloc for failure or chase nasty bugs
if(!buf) exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
sprintf(buf, format_string, ent->value);
putenv(buf);
}
}
Since we're using malloc the allocation will remain after the function exits. And for the same reason, we make sure that the buffer is big enough beforehand, and thus, using snprintf instead of sprintf is not necessary.
Theoretically, this has a memory leak unless you use free on all strings you have allocated, but in reality, not freeing before exiting main is very rarely a problem. Might be good to know though.
It can also be good to know that even though this code now is fairly protected, it's still not thread safe. The content of query_string and thus also ent->value may be altered. Your code does not show it, but it seems highly likely that find_entry returns a pointer that points somewhere in query_string. This can of course also be solved, but it can get complicated.
Related
Consider:
CCustomDateTime::CCustomDateTime()
{
LPTSTR result = new TCHAR[1024];
time_t _currentTime_t = time(0);
tm now;
localtime_s(&now, &_currentTime_t);
_tasctime_s(result, _tcslen(result), &now);
_currentTime = result;
delete[] result; // Error occurs here
}
CCustomDateTime::~CCustomDateTime()
{
}
__int64 CCustomDateTime::CurrentTimeAsInt64()
{
return _currentTime_t;
}
LPTSTR CCustomDateTime::CurrentTimeAsString()
{
return _currentTime;
}
I am unable to figure out the safest place to call delete[] on result.
If delete[] is ignored everything is fine, but otherwise an error occurs:
HEAP CORUPTION DETECTED at line delete[]
_tcslen(result) is not doing what you think it is.
change
_tasctime_s(result, _tcslen(result), &now);
to
_tasctime_s(result, 1024, &now);
There are a few problems with your code that I can see:
You don't check any of the function calls for errors. Don't ignore the return value. Use it to check for errors.
The second argument to _tasctime_s is the number of elements in the buffer provided. In other words, 1024. But you pass _tcslen(result) which is the length of the null-terminated string. Not only is that the wrong value, but result is at that point not initialised, so your code has undefined behaviour.
You assign a value to _currentTime, and then immediately delete that memory. So, _currentTime is a stale pointer. Any attempt to read from that memory is yet more undefined behaviour.
I don't want to tell you what your code should be, because you have only given us a tiny window into what you are trying to achieve. Dynamically allocating a fixed length array seems pointless. You may as well use automatically allocated storage. Of course, if you do want to return the memory to the caller, then dynamic allocation makes sense, but in that case then surely the caller would be responsible for calling delete[]. Since this code is clearly C++ I have to wonder why you are using raw memory allocation. Why not use standard library classes like std::string?
Looking at your update to the question, you could deallocate the memory in the destructor of your class. Personally though, I would recommend learning about the standard library classes that will greatly simplify your code.
_tcslen maps to strlen or wcslen depending on whether you are using ANSI or Unicode, respectively.
Both these functions return the length of a string, not the size of the buffer. In other words, they take a pointer to the first character of a string and continuously increment the pointer in search of a null terminator.
Calling these functions on an uninitialized buffer is undefined behavior because there's a very good chance that the pointer will get incremented out of the array bounds and elsewhere into the process' memory.
I am trying to write a wrapper around Windows file functions, one would read num bytes amount of data from the file and retrun it. For some reason I fail to allocate the memory properly, but I just can't find the reason why:
PBYTE Read(int num_bytes, HANDLER hFile){
PBYTE bBuffer;
DWORD new_size = sizeof(BYTE)*num_bytes;
//after the allocation the debugger already displays a 16 char wide placeholder
bBuffer = (PBYTE)malloc(new_size);
OVERLAPPED o = { 0 };
o.Offset = 0;
BOOL bReadDone = ReadFile(hFile, (LPVOID)bBuffer, sizeof(BYTE)*num_bytes, NULL, &o);
return bBuffer;
}
Data gets copied, but the allocated buffer is always too wide and contains extra wierd filler characters. Can sby please explain what am I doing wrong?
"what am I doing wrong?"
sizeof(BYTE) is 1 so you can remove it everywhere and eliminate the redundant new_size variable.
You tagged your question C++ but used malloc to allocate the buffer. Your design makes the caller responsible for freeing the buffer, which is a poor design approach, and even more so by using malloc/free in C++ program. A good C++ solution to this quandry would be to return a
std::vector.
It is vital that you provide the lpNumberOfBytesRead parameter to ReadFile. Without it you don't know how many bytes were read. And if you don't know how many bytes were read you can't tell the difference between "extra wierd filler characters" and unused memory at the end of the buffer. If the data is characters then character-oriented output routines (and debugger tools) don't know the difference either, since there is no null terminator at the end of the data that was actually read. You could use NumberOfBytesRead to put in a nul terminator so you and the debugger don't read beyond the real data.
My boss told me to look at the following code and tell him what the potential security vulnerabilities were. I'm not very good at this kind of thing, since I don't think in the way of trying to hack code. All I see is that nothing is declared private, but other than that I just don't know.
#define NAME_SIZE (unsigned char) 255
// user input should contain the user’s name (first name space
// middle initial space last name and a null
// character), and was entered directly by the user.
// Returns the first character in the user input, or -1 if the method failed.
char poor_method(char* user_input, char* first, char *middle, char* last)
{
char*buffer;
char length;
// find first name
buffer = strtok(user_input, " ");
if(buffer==0)
{
return -1;
}
length = strlen(buffer);
if(length <= NAME_SIZE)
{
strcpy(first, buffer);
}
// find middle name
buffer = strtok(NULL, " ");
if(buffer==0)
{
return-1;
}
if(middle)
*middle = buffer[0];
// find last name
buffer = strtok(NULL, "\0");
length = strlen(buffer);
if(length <= NAME_SIZE)
{
strcpy(last, buffer);
}
// Check to make sure that all of the user input was used
buffer = strtok(NULL, "\0");
if(buffer != NULL)
{
return-1;
}
return first[0];
}
What security vulnerabilities are there?
Get good at writing secure code
You most likely don't want systems that you are responsible for finding their way onto bugtraq or cve. If you don't understand it, be honest with your boss. Tell him you don't understand and you want to work on it. Pick up Writing Secure Code. Read it, learn it, love it. Asking this question on SO and giving your boss the answer definitely doesn't help you in the long run.
Then look at the sample code again :)
What I saw (by no means a complete list):
There's no guarantees you're going to get a char pointer which points to a null-terminating string (unless you're allowed to make that assumption, not really a safe one to make).
strtok and strcpy are the C way of doing things and come with the fun stuff of programming C code. If you must use them, so be it (just make sure you can guarantee you're inputs to these functions will indeed be valid). Otherwise, try switching your code to use std::string and the "C++ way" (as Cat Plus Plus put it)
I'm assuming this is a typo:
charpoor_method(
You're missing a space between char and poor_method(
You're not checking if first or last are indeed valid pointers (unfortunately, the best you can do is to check them against NULL).
There's no guarantee that the buffers first or last can indeed hold whatever you're copying to them.
Another typo:
returnfirst[0];
missing space between return and first[0]
Learning to write secure code is something that's very important to do. Follow Brecht's advice and get good at it.
Ok strtok assumes user_input is NULL terminated, this might not be true.
charlength = strlen(buffer);
if(length <= NAME_SIZE)
{
strcpy(first, buffer);
}
charlenght here is undeclared, so is length, they should be declared as unsigned int.
strlen wont count the '\0' as a part of the length, so later strcpy will copy the '\0' to whatever is after First if the len of buffer is 255 + 1('\0')
Also is unknown if char *first size is, it should be NAME_SIZE but the comparisson should be
length <= NAME_SIZE - 1
or allocate char *first to NAME_SIZE + 1
I'd probably rewrite the whole thing, is quite ugly.
Rather than using strcpy(), use strncpy() with a specific length parameter, as that function, like strtok(), assumes a NULL-terminated buffer for the source, and that may not be the case, giving you a buffer overflow for the data copied into the buffer pointed to by either first or last. Additionally, you have no idea how long the buffers are that have been allocated for first and last ... Don't assume that the user of your function has properly allocated enough memory to copy into unless they've passed you a parameter telling you there are enough memory slots in the buffers. Otherwise again, you could (and most likely will) end-up with buffer overflows.
Also you may want to use the restrict keyword if you're using C99 in order to prevent the caller of your function from aliasing the same memory location for buffer, first, and last.
OWASP says:
"C library functions such as strcpy
(), strcat (), sprintf () and vsprintf
() operate on null terminated strings
and perform no bounds checking."
sprintf writes formatted data to string
int sprintf ( char * str, const char * format, ... );
Example:
sprintf(str, "%s", message); // assume declaration and
// initialization of variables
If I understand OWASP's comment, then the dangers of using sprintf are that
1) if message's length > str's length, there's a buffer overflow
and
2) if message does not null-terminate with \0, then message could get copied into str beyond the memory address of message, causing a buffer overflow
Please confirm/deny. Thanks
You're correct on both problems, though they're really both the same problem (which is accessing data beyond the boundaries of an array).
A solution to your first problem is to instead use std::snprintf, which accepts a buffer size as an argument.
A solution to your second problem is to give a maximum length argument to snprintf. For example:
char buffer[128];
std::snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "This is a %.4s\n", "testGARBAGE DATA");
// std::strcmp(buffer, "This is a test\n") == 0
If you want to store the entire string (e.g. in the case sizeof(buffer) is too small), run snprintf twice:
int length = std::snprintf(nullptr, 0, "This is a %.4s\n", "testGARBAGE DATA");
++length; // +1 for null terminator
char *buffer = new char[length];
std::snprintf(buffer, length, "This is a %.4s\n", "testGARBAGE DATA");
(You can probably fit this into a function using va or variadic templates.)
Both of your assertions are correct.
There's an additional problem not mentioned. There is no type checking on the parameters. If you mismatch the format string and the parameters, undefined and undesirable behavior could result. For example:
char buf[1024] = {0};
float f = 42.0f;
sprintf(buf, "%s", f); // `f` isn't a string. the sun may explode here
This can be particularly nasty to debug.
All of the above lead many C++ developers to the conclusion that you should never use sprintf and its brethren. Indeed, there are facilities you can use to avoid all of the above problems. One, streams, is built right in to the language:
#include <sstream>
#include <string>
// ...
float f = 42.0f;
stringstream ss;
ss << f;
string s = ss.str();
...and another popular choice for those who, like me, still prefer to use sprintf comes from the boost Format libraries:
#include <string>
#include <boost\format.hpp>
// ...
float f = 42.0f;
string s = (boost::format("%1%") %f).str();
Should you adopt the "never use sprintf" mantra? Decide for yourself. There's usually a best tool for the job and depending on what you're doing, sprintf just might be it.
Yes, it is mostly a matter of buffer overflows. However, those are quite serious business nowdays, since buffer overflows are the prime attack vector used by system crackers to circumvent software or system security. If you expose something like this to user input, there's a very good chance you are handing the keys to your program (or even your computer itself) to the crackers.
From OWASP's perspective, let's pretend we are writing a web server, and we use sprintf to parse the input that a browser passes us.
Now let's suppose someone malicious out there passes our web browser a string far larger than will fit in the buffer we chose. His extra data will instead overwrite nearby data. If he makes it large enough, some of his data will get copied over the webserver's instructions rather than its data. Now he can get our webserver to execute his code.
Your 2 numbered conclusions are correct, but incomplete.
There is an additional risk:
char* format = 0;
char buf[128];
sprintf(buf, format, "hello");
Here, format is not NULL-terminated. sprintf() doesn't check that either.
Your interpretation seems to be correct. However, your case #2 isn't really a buffer overflow. It's more of a memory access violation. That's just terminology though, it's still a major problem.
The sprintf function, when used with certain format specifiers, poses two types of security risk: (1) writing memory it shouldn't; (2) reading memory it shouldn't. If snprintf is used with a size parameter that matches the buffer, it won't write anything it shouldn't. Depending upon the parameters, it may still read stuff it shouldn't. Depending upon the operating environment and what else a program is doing, the danger from improper reads may or may not be less severe than that from improper writes.
It is very important to remember that sprintf() adds the ASCII 0 character as string terminator at the end of each string. Therefore, the destination buffer must have at least n+1 bytes (To print the word "HELLO", a 6-byte buffer is required, NOT 5)
In the example below, it may not be obvious, but in the 2-byte destination buffer, the second byte will be overwritten by ASCII 0 character. If only 1 byte was allocated for the buffer, this would cause buffer overrun.
char buf[3] = {'1', '2'};
int n = sprintf(buf, "A");
Also note that the return value of sprintf() does NOT include the null-terminating character. In the example above, 2 bytes were written, but the function returns '1'.
In the example below, the first byte of class member variable 'i' would be partially overwritten by sprintf() (on a 32-bit system).
struct S
{
char buf[4];
int i;
};
int main()
{
struct S s = { };
s.i = 12345;
int num = sprintf(s.buf, "ABCD");
// The value of s.i is NOT 12345 anymore !
return 0;
}
I pretty much have stated a small example how you could get rid of the buffer size declaration for the sprintf (if you intended to, of course!) and no snprintf envolved ....
Note: This is an APPEND/CONCATENATION example, take a look at here
I'm working in C++.
I want to write a potentially very long formatted string using sprintf (specifically a secure counted version like _snprintf_s, but the idea is the same). The approximate length is unknown at compile time so I'll have to use some dynamically allocated memory rather than relying on a big static buffer. Is there any way to determine how many characters will be needed for a particular sprintf call so I can always be sure I've got a big enough buffer?
My fallback is I'll just take the length of the format string, double it, and try that. If it works, great, if it doesn't I'll just double the size of the buffer and try again. Repeat until it fits. Not exactly the cleverest solution.
It looks like C99 supports passing NULL to snprintf to get the length. I suppose I could create a module to wrap that functionality if nothing else, but I'm not crazy about that idea.
Maybe an fprintf to "/dev/null"/"nul" might work instead? Any other ideas?
EDIT: Alternatively, is there any way to "chunk" the sprintf so it picks up mid-write? If that's possible it could fill the buffer, process it, then start refilling from where it left off.
The man page for snprintf says:
Return value
Upon successful return, these functions return the number of
characters printed (not including the trailing '\0' used to end
output to strings). The functions snprintf and vsnprintf do not
write more than size bytes (including the trailing '\0'). If
the output was truncated due to this limit then the return value
is the number of characters (not including the trailing '\0')
which would have been written to the final string if enough
space had been available. Thus, a return value of size or more
means that the output was truncated. (See also below under
NOTES.) If an output error is encountered, a negative value is
returned.
What this means is that you can call snprintf with a size of 0. Nothing will get written, and the return value will tell you how much space you need to allocate to your string:
int how_much_space = snprintf(NULL, 0, fmt_string, param0, param1, ...);
As others have mentioned, snprintf() will return the number of characters required in a buffer to prevent the output from being truncated. You can simply call it with a 0 buffer length parameter to get the required size then use an appropriately sized buffer.
For a slight improvement in efficiency, you can call it with a buffer that's large enough for the normal case and only do a second call to snprintf() if the output is truncated. In order to make sure the buffer(s) are properly freed in that case, I'll often use an auto_buffer<> object that handles the dynamic memory for me (and has the default buffer on the stack to avoid a heap allocation in the normal case).
If you're using a Microsoft compiler, MS has a non-standard _snprintf() that has serious limitations of not always null terminating the buffer and not indicating how big the buffer should be.
To work around Microsoft's non-support, I use a nearly public domain snprintf() from Holger Weiss.
Of course if your non-MS C or C++ compiler is missing snprintf(), the code from the above link should work just as well.
I would use a two-stage approach. Generally, a large percentage of output strings will be under a certain threshold and only a few will be larger.
Stage 1, use a reasonable sized static buffer such as 4K. Since snprintf() can restrict how many characters are written, you won't get a buffer overflow. What you will get returned from snprintf() is the number of characters it would have written if your buffer had been big enough.
If your call to snprintf() returns less than 4K, then use the buffer and exit. As stated, the vast majority of calls should just do that.
Some will not and that's when you enter stage 2. If the call to snprintf() won't fit in the 4K buffer, you at least now know how big a buffer you need.
Allocate, with malloc(), a buffer big enough to hold it then snprintf() it again to that new buffer. When you're done with the buffer, free it.
We worked on a system in the days before snprintf() and we acheived the same result by having a file handle connected to /dev/null and using fprintf() with that. /dev/null was always guaranteed to take as much data as you give it so we would actually get the size from that, then allocate a buffer if necessary.
Keep in kind that not all systems have snprintf() (for example, I understand it's _snprintf() in Microsoft C) so you may have to find the function that does the same job, or revert to the fprintf /dev/null solution.
Also be careful if the data can be changed between the size-checking snprintf() and the actual snprintf() to the buffer (i.e., wathch out for threads). If the sizes increase, you'll get buffer overflow corruption.
If you follow the rule that data, once handed to a function, belongs to that function exclusively until handed back, this won't be a problem.
For what it's worth, asprintf is a GNU extension that manages this functionality. It accepts a pointer as an output argument, along with a format string and a variable number of arguments, and writes back to the pointer the address of a properly-allocated buffer containing the result.
You can use it like so:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char const *argv[])
{
char *hi = "hello"; // these could be really long
char *everyone = "world";
char *message;
asprintf(&message, "%s %s", hi, everyone);
puts(message);
free(message);
return 0;
}
Hope this helps someone!
Take a look at CodeProject: CString-clone Using Standard C++. It uses solution you suggested with enlarging buffer size.
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// FUNCTION: FormatV
// void FormatV(PCSTR szFormat, va_list, argList);
//
// DESCRIPTION:
// This function formats the string with sprintf style format-specs.
// It makes a general guess at required buffer size and then tries
// successively larger buffers until it finds one big enough or a
// threshold (MAX_FMT_TRIES) is exceeded.
//
// PARAMETERS:
// szFormat - a PCSTR holding the format of the output
// argList - a Microsoft specific va_list for variable argument lists
//
// RETURN VALUE:
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
void FormatV(const CT* szFormat, va_list argList)
{
#ifdef SS_ANSI
int nLen = sslen(szFormat) + STD_BUF_SIZE;
ssvsprintf(GetBuffer(nLen), nLen-1, szFormat, argList);
ReleaseBuffer();
#else
CT* pBuf = NULL;
int nChars = 1;
int nUsed = 0;
size_type nActual = 0;
int nTry = 0;
do
{
// Grow more than linearly (e.g. 512, 1536, 3072, etc)
nChars += ((nTry+1) * FMT_BLOCK_SIZE);
pBuf = reinterpret_cast<CT*>(_alloca(sizeof(CT)*nChars));
nUsed = ssnprintf(pBuf, nChars-1, szFormat, argList);
// Ensure proper NULL termination.
nActual = nUsed == -1 ? nChars-1 : SSMIN(nUsed, nChars-1);
pBuf[nActual+1]= '\0';
} while ( nUsed < 0 && nTry++ < MAX_FMT_TRIES );
// assign whatever we managed to format
this->assign(pBuf, nActual);
#endif
}
I've looked for the same functionality you're talking about, but as far as I know, something as simple as the C99 method is not available in C++, because C++ does not currently incorporate the features added in C99 (such as snprintf).
Your best bet is probably to use a stringstream object. It's a bit more cumbersome than a clearly written sprintf call, but it will work.
Since you're using C++, there's really no need to use any version of sprintf. The simplest thing to do is use a std::ostringstream.
std::ostringstream oss;
oss << a << " " << b << std::endl;
oss.str() returns a std::string with the contents of what you've written to oss. Use oss.str().c_str() to get a const char *. It's going to be a lot easier to deal with in the long run and eliminates memory leaks or buffer overruns. Generally, if you're worrying about memory issues like that in C++, you're not using the language to its full potential, and you should rethink your design.