AWS IAM Policy permissions query - amazon-web-services

I am new to AWS IAM and I am learning to do a security audit for AWS.
For a specific user in AWS the JSON permissions policy looks like this (Account no changed of course)
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": {
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
"Resource": [
"arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/APP-NonProd-BC",
"arn:aws:iam::111111111112:role/APP-nonProd-Admins",
"arn:aws:iam::123456789011:role/APP-nonProd-AdminAccess-Role",
"arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/App-NonProd-S3Ops",
"arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/APY-nonProd-EC2Admin"
]
}
}
My question is - Where I can find the permissions for each of the resources. Means, for APP-nonProd-BC resource : what kind of permissions apply?
For APP-nonprod-AdminAccess-Role : is it really have Admin Access or its just named as AdminAccess and where I Can find the permissions definitions ?
I searched in permissions but not able to find relevent for each of the resources "App-nonProd-BC" or App-nonprod-adminaccess-role" etc. Kindly help.

These are rules to allow the User to assume these roles. Look within the IAM roles defined and you should be able to see the associated permissions. Permissions can be given to roles, and then user allocated to the roles, so that you can change all the permissions at once and simplify the permission process.

Related

Allow developers to create AWS Lambda or SAM without granting Administrator access

It seems to be impossible to allow developers to create Lambdas and create or maintain SAM Applications in AWS without essentially having AdministratorAccess policies attached to their developer's role. AWS documents a suggested IAM setup where everyone is simply Administrator, or only has IAMFullAccess, or a even more specific set of permissions containing "iam:AttachRolePolicy" which all boils down to still having enough access to grant the AdministratorAccess permission to anyone at will with just 1 API call.
Besides creating a new AWS Account for each SAM or Lambda deployment there doesn't seem to be any secure way to manage this, but I really hope I'm missing something obvious. Perhaps someone knows of a combination of tags, permission boundaries and IAM Paths that would alleviate this?
The documentation I refer to: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/serverless-application-model/latest/developerguide/sam-permissions.html which opens with:
There are three main options for granting a user permission to manage
serverless applications. Each option provides users with different
levels of access control.
Grant administrator permissions.
Attach necessary AWS managed policies.
Grant specific AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) permissions.
Further down, a sample application is used to specify slightly more specific permissions:
For example, the following AWS managed policies are sufficient to
deploy the sample Hello World application:
AWSCloudFormationFullAccess
IAMFullAccess
AWSLambda_FullAccess
AmazonAPIGatewayAdministrator
AmazonS3FullAccess
AmazonEC2ContainerRegistryFullAccess
And at the end of the document an AWS IAM Policy document describes a set of permissions which is rather lengthy, but contains the mentioned "iam:AttachRolePolicy" permission with a wildcard resource for roles it may be applied on.
AWS has a PowerUserAccess managed policy which is meant for developers. It gives them access to most of the services and no access to admin activities including IAM, Organization and Account management.
You can create an IAM Group for developers (Say Developers) and add the managed policy PowerUserAccess to the group. Add developers to this group.
For deploying with SAM, the developers would need a few IAM permissions to create roles, tag roles. While rolling back a CloudFormation Stack, they may need a few delete permissions. While allowing the developers to create new roles for Lambda functions, you need to ensure they don't escalate privileges by using permissions boundary. A good starting point again would be to set the permissions boundary to PowerUserAccess. (until you figure out what is the right level of permissions)
Create a Policy something like this
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "ReadRole",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"iam:GetRole",
"iam:GetRolePolicy",
"iam:ListRoleTags"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:iam::ReplaceWithYourAWSAccountNumber:role/*FunctionRole*"
},
{
"Sid": "TagRole",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"iam:UntagRole",
"iam:TagRole"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:iam::ReplaceWithYourAWSAccountNumber:role/*FunctionRole*"
},
{
"Sid": "WriteRole",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"iam:DeleteRole",
"iam:DeleteRolePolicy",
"iam:AttachRolePolicy",
"iam:PutRolePolicy",
"iam:PassRole",
"iam:DetachRolePolicy"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:iam::ReplaceWithYourAWSAccountNumber:role/*FunctionRole*"
},
{
"Sid": "CreateRoleWithPermissionsBoundry",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"iam:CreateRole"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:iam::ReplaceWithYourAWSAccountNumber:role/*FunctionRole*",
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"iam:PermissionsBoundary": "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/PowerUserAccess"
}
}
}
]
}
Note: It assumes the Lambda function names in the SAM template contains the word Function in them. (Replace the AWS Account Number in the ARNs).
Now you can attach the above policy to the Developers IAM Group. (This would give the SAM deployment permissions to all the developers)
Or you can create another IAM Group for SAM developers (Say SAM-Developers) and attach the above policy to the SAM-Developers group. Now add the appropriate developers (who need to deploy using SAM) to this new IAM group (SAM-Developers).
Define the Permissions Boundary in the SAM templates as well.
Here is an example PermissionsBoundary in SAM template.
Globals:
Function:
Timeout: 15
PermissionsBoundary: arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/PowerUserAccess
With that, the developers should be able to deploy using SAM provided they do not have any restrictive permission boundary.
You can set the permission boundary to AdministratorAccess for the developers or create a new Policy which combines the permissions of PowerUserAccess and the above defined policy for 'SAM' deployments. Then set this new Policy as the permission boundary for the developers.
This solution is for reference and you can build upon this. The PowerUserAccess has been set as the permissions boundary for the Lambda function roles. The PowerUserAccess is too permissive and you should further work on this to find out the right level of permission for your developers and the Lambda functions.
Sidenote: You can use this policy to allow the users to manage their own credentials.

Am I allowed to connect to arbitrary RDS DB instances if given the RDS DbiResourceId?

I am checking the steps of setting up IAM auth in RDS: https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/users-connect-rds-iam/ And one of the steps is to attach the IAM role with proper permission: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/UserGuide/UsingWithRDS.IAMDBAuth.IAMPolicy.html
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"rds-db:connect"
],
"Resource": [
"arn:aws:rds-db:us-east-2:1234567890:dbuser:db-ABCDEFGHIJKL01234/db_user"
]
}
]
}
The resource follows this format:
arn:aws:rds-db:region:account-id:dbuser:DbiResourceId/db-user-name
If I understand correctly, as long as I know someone's account-id, DbiResourceId and db-user-name (or maybe db-user-name as I can use wildcard?), then I am able to connect to that DB instance, right?
This sounds insecure. Did I miss anything?
No this would not be possible. The only want to interact with this resource would be to assume a role in the target account.
You can use an IAM role to allow someone (a trusted principal) in a different account to access resources in your account. Roles are the primary way to grant cross-account access. However, with some AWS services, you can attach a policy directly to a resource (instead of using a role as a proxy). To learn the difference between roles and resource-based policies for cross-account access, see How IAM Roles Differ from Resource-based Policies in the IAM User Guide

IAM Role for an IAM User within same account for Console Access

I am trying to create an IAM user and I want to assign the user for Full S3 Access using IAM role (via console access). I know I can do that using Group or attaching the S3FullAccessPolicy directly to the user. I am unable to do this and could not find any help regarding this. The articles I come across describes how you can attach IAM policies to EC2 instance etc.
I managed to create a role and attached a trust policy as below. I also attached the policy "AmazonS3FullAccess" to the role.
But it never worked if I login using AWS management console (browser). It still denies all permission to the user for S3 access. The trusted entities policy looks like below - the IAM username I am trying to use is s3AdminUserWithRole. Th eAWS account id is 6XXXXXXXXXXX0
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {
"AWS": [
"arn:aws:iam::6XXXXXXXXXXX0:user/s3AdminUserWithRole",
"arn:aws:iam::6XXXXXXXXXXX0:root"
]
},
"Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
"Condition": {}
}
]
}
Is it not possible to do like this for AWS Management console for a user? We have to use only Groups /managed policies/ inline policies and NOT roles for this? Confused about the AWS documentation then.
Based on the comments, the solution is to use sts service and its assume-role API.
For Console there is Switch Role option.

Allow multiple AWS accounts to view resources

AWS allows you to invite AWS accounts into your organization and manage them with OUs. However, AWS accounts in the same OU do not seem to have access to the same resources. It seems like the only solution is to create IAM users under a common account and create resources as the account, but then human users have to share credentials to that main account. Is there a way to allow different human users to create resources with their own credentials and never share credentials? I do not understand the value of separating accounts from IAM and it is ultimately confusing my understanding of resource management security best practices.
AWS recommends that you give users access to roles in different account. As in have all your users in one "central" AWS account and then have your IAM users login to different AWS accounts using a role rather than using straight credentials. See below for an example IAM policy that you would attach to your IAM user.
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "StmtXXXXXX",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"sts:AssumeRole"
],
"Resource": [
"arn:aws:iam::{AccountID}:role/{RoleName}"
]
}
]}

How can I give only specific AWS "iam : putUserPolicy" permissions?

Use case: In our application we need to give iam : putUserPolicy permissions to IAM entities. That is trivial. We can assign the policy mentioned below to the IAM entity to which we want to give iam : putUserPolicy permission
{
"Version":"2012-10-17",
"Statement":[
{
"Effect":"Allow",
"Action":[
"iam : putUserPolicy"
],
"Resource":"*"
}
]
}
Let's say we have another requirement and assign putUserPolicy to IAM user U1. This means that now U1 can assign ANY policy to ANY IAM user. The second "ANY" can be avoided by changing "Resource":"*" to "Resource":"user-arn", but how do we deal with the first ANY?
Is there a way to give "iam : putUserPolicy" permission such that putting only "iam : CreateUser" permission is allowed? Or perhaps only "iam : CreateUser" is blocked and putting rest all policies is allowed?
I went through the AWS documentation and I found conditions kind of helpful but I could not find any IAM service-specific keys and values though I did find some for EC2 and SNS.
As an example we can assign the following policy:
{
"Version":"2012-10-17",
"Statement":[{
"Effect":"Allow",
"Action":["s3:ListBucket"],
"Resource":"*",
"Condition":{"StringNotEquals":["s3:prefix":"arn:aws:s3:::BUCKET-NAME/home/"]}
}
]
}
which gives permissions to all other S3 folders and buckets except the home folder in a particular bucket.
Can we do something like this?
{
"Version":"2012-10-17",
"Statement":[{
"Effect":"Allow",
"Action":["iam:PutUserPolicy"],
"Resource":"*",
"Condition":{"StringNotEquals":["iam:policy-contains":"iam:CreateUser"]}
}
]
}
AWS has just introduced Managed Policies for AWS Identity & Access Management, which provide a fresh approach to sharing and maintaining IAM policies across IAM entities, notably also including Delegating permissions management, see Controlling Access to Managed Policies:
Managed policies give you precise control over how your users can manage policies and manage permissions for others. You can separately control who can create, update, and delete policies, and who can attach and detach policies to and from principal entities (users, groups, and roles). You can also control which policies a user can attach or detach, and to and from which entities. [emphasis mine]
A typical scenario is that you give permissions to an account administrator to create, update, and delete policies. Then, you give permissions to a team leader or other limited administrator to attach and detach these policies [...].
Section Controlling Permissions for Attaching and Detaching Managed Policies provides an Example policy that allows attaching only specific managed policies to only specific groups or roles, which conceptually allows you to achieve what you are looking for:
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": {
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"iam:AttachGroupPolicy",
"iam:AttachRolePolicy"
],
"Resource": [
"arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT-ID-WITHOUT-HYPHENS:group/TEAM-A/*",
"arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT-ID-WITHOUT-HYPHENS:role/TEAM-A/*"
],
"Condition": {"ArnLike":
{"iam:PolicyArn": "arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT-ID-WITHOUT-HYPHENS:policy/TEAM-A/*"}
}
}
}