Does HTML encoding prevent XSS security exploits? - xss

By simply converting the following ("the big 5"):
& -> &
< -> <
> -> >
" -> "
' -> '
Will you prevent XSS attacks?
I think you need to white list at a character level too, to prevent certain attacks, but the following answer states it overcomplicates matters.
EDIT This page details it does not prevent more elaborate injections, does not help with "out of range characters = question marks" when outputting Strings to Writers with single byte encodings, nor prevents character reinterpretation when user switches browser encoding over displayed page. In essence just escaping these characters seems to be quite a naive approach.

Will you prevent XSS attacks?
If you do this escaping at the right time(*) then yes, you will prevent HTML-injection. This is the most common form of XSS attack. It is not just a matter of security, you need to do the escapes anyway so that strings with those characters in will display correctly anyway. The issue of security is a subset of the issue of correctness.
I think you need to white list at a character level too, to prevent certain attacks
No. HTML-escaping will render every one of those attacks as inactive plain text on the page, which is what you want. The range of attacks on that page is demonstrating different ways to do HTML-injection, which can get around the stupider “XSS filters” that some servers deploy to try to prevent common HTML-injection attacks. This demonstrates that “XSS filters” are inherently leaky and ineffective.
There are other forms of XSS attack that might or might not affect you, for example bad schemes on user-submitted URIs (javascript: et al), injection of code into data echoed into a JavaScript block (where you need JSON-style escaping) or into stylesheets or HTTP response headers (again, you always need the appropriate form of encoding when you drop text into another context; you should always be suspicious if you see anything with unescaped interpolation like PHP's "string $var string").
Then there's file upload handling, Flash origin policy, UTF-8 overlong sequences in legacy browsers, and application-level content generation issues; all of these can potentially lead to cross-site scripting. But HTML injection is the main one that every web application will face, and most PHP applications get wrong today.
(*: which is when inserting text content into HTML, and at no other time. Do not HTML-escape form submission data in $_POST/$_GET at the start of your script; this is a common wrong-headed mistake.)

OWASP has a great cheat sheet.
Golden Rules
Strategies
Etc.
https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/master/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.md

Counter measures depend on the context where the data is inserted in. If you insert the data into HTML, replacing the HTML meta character with escape sequences (i.e. character references) prevents inserting HTML code.
But if your in another context (e.g. HTML attribute value that is interpreted as URL) you have additional meta characters with different escape sequences you have to deal with.

Related

Is it safe to wrap an entire CFM page in a cfoutput tag

I am placing a <cfoutput> tag around my entire <html> tag. The ColdBox best practice guide states "When you are creating view templates, try to always surround it with 1 cfoutput tag, instead of nesting them all over the place."
But I have on occasion seen errors pop up where a <script> block containing javascript code is within the <cfoutput> tag. This probably because Coldfusion sees a hash # and tries to parse it but it can't because its javascript.
So how does one get away with having a single <cfoutput> tag on a view page in which to place everything?
I am not aware of any significant security or performance concerns in regards to wrapping an entire page in cfoutput. Of course, you'll always need to be aware to escape any pound signs by doubling them up any time you're inside a cfoutput.
The best practices in that ColdBox guide are geared primarily toward readability and reducing clutter on the page. If you have large sections of the page that you don't want to escape pound signs on or if you like to use cfoutput's grouping functionality, there's nothing wrong with breaking up your cfoutputs in a way that makes sense.
In the olden days of CF there might have been more overhead, but these days I can't imagine it being more than a few nanoseconds, and that's once at compile time.
In my view files I tend to wrap all output in a single cfoutput tag.
You can escape # symbols in JavaScript, etc, by converting them to ##.
The simple answer to your question as posted is yes.
There are only two issues that I'm aware of to keep in mind:
Escape any single hashtags (#) with double hashtags (##) that may occur in your code (i.e., CSS, JS, etc.) ... unless the hashtags are actually being wrapped around a CFML function or variable.
If you're using "cfoutput query...", you will probably want to close the first "cfoutput" tag, and then reopen after the query output. Otherwise, you can run into issues when trying to group query output.
My preference is to use as few tags as possible, mostly for readability and to reduce clutter.

Multi language website, how to approach this?

I have a website (Coldfusion) on which I want to offer multi language, but no idea what is the best way to do this.
There 2 plans I have:
1:
Of course all content (text) is in a database.
If a user would want a different language, the user would click on a link/flag, this would put the requested language in a session variable, for example: session.language = "es"
In the database I would have 2 columns (every language has 1 column) and then select the text which belongs to 'es'
Every page would then do a request to the database to get the text beloging to the session.language.
PROS: Relatively simple to implement
CONS: SEO wise I don't think this could be very good. http:// www.domain.com/page.cfm would give an english text or spanish text (or other language). Google will not add duplicate URL's
2:
Do something with http:// www.domain.com/en/page.cfm for english and http:// www.domain.com/es/page.cfm for english.
With a URL rewrite rule the language value in the URL http:// www.domain.com/en/page.cfm would actually be a page http:// www.domain.com/page.cfm?language=en
The url.language variable will then select the correct language from the database.
PROS: Unique URL for each language. Good for SEO and Google indexing.
CONS: A bit more difficult to implement. (I think)
Or does anyone have other / better ideas?
Thanks!!
You should always first check the browser header "Accept-Language" for the default language(s) (the correct standard way to do it), and offer links (the intuitively seemingly right way) only as an alternative.
Doing it in a database doesn't seem very standard. Let's assume you would like to use MVC architecture (model-view-controller). Most software uses keys in the presentation layer (view) (eg. html) and along with the presentation layer, you have language files (in Java, this is typically properties files) which are mapped simply by their filenames, and can be modified by regular users, without any special skills, such as professional translators with no computer skills. Certainly you could put it in a database, but then it is just more work, and moves the information out of the presentation layer.
There are various libraries for doing this. You should find the normal one for your application. Please edit your question to include what you are using to develop the application. (eg. JSP, Tapestry, Wicket, ASP, PHP, etc.) So for example, if you wanted to use JSPs, I would then suggest you use the JSTL tag library's language support. Or if you were using Tapestry, I would point you to http://tapestry.apache.org/localization.html or http://tapestry.apache.org/tapestry4.1/UsersGuide/localization.html
To look it up, you can look for the terms "internationalization" aka "i18n", or "localization". (The terms don't mean the same thing, but few use them correctly, so either works. http://www.w3.org/International/questions/qa-i18n)
I would go for option 2. Every translation should have its own url. Links to your website will already be in the intended translation.
To store translations in a database, I wouldn't put every translation in a seperate column, but rather put them in a seperate table:
Table Posts:
- id
- title_id
- ...
Table Translations:
- label_id
- value
- country_code
- language_code
Where title_id matches label_id
This way you won't have to alter your table structure when a new translation is added. This allows you to have infinite translations for any label or text.
To effectively do a multi-lingual site then you need set a rule for yourself that NO TEXT is ever put in the source as hard coded. It either needs to come from the database and / or a Resource Bundle.
Text from the database
You need to make sure that the column you are storing your data in is unicode otherwise you'll have issues with accented character. Also don't have a column per language as this is not scalable, do what #jan suggests and have a translations table where the items are keyed on a reference as well as a language.
Resource bundles
You are not going to want to get every last little bit of text from the database so for those you can utilise a resource bundle. This is an, admittedly old, link http://www.sustainablegis.com/blog/cfg11n/index.cfm?mode=entry&entry=FD48909C-50FC-543B-1FE177C1B97E8CC1 from Paul Hastings's blog about some solutions to resource bundles. To be honest his blog is an excellent resource on this very subject.
With regards to how you handle the URLs do not do option 1 as you quite rightly identified you will cause issues the SEO rankings of the page and it will mean that users cannot correctly share or return to the page.
Two approaches are having the language code in the URL as you identified in option 1.
Pros
Simpler to configure
Cons
You have one application which means that as you add more languages you add more complexity and weight on the memory of that app
Or you can have a different sub domain or domain per application e.g. es.yourdomain.com or yourdomain.es they can all be the same codebase
Pros
Each language is a standalone application meaning it has it's own memory
Cons
more effort to configure
http://i18n.riaforge.org/ has a download for i18n. It can be used to make sure that all string labels match. That way if some one wants to change "Save" to "Update", it can all be done in one spot.
It is also important to consider the technical background of those that will being doing the translation. It is often easier to get the translation team to edit files in notepad as opposed to updating a db. Text files work well with version control.
The best way i found is to use an XML to hold just that pages language stuff, one xml to cover each page, and you then vary it for language. when the page loads, just load a different XML from the database or files... many ways to do this. all other methods i have tried have their issues, and at least this one allows you to take a language XML, hand it to someone who will copy it, and then change the boxes... you put it in the DB to serve it.
one can also do this for text, and have the DB make the XML for just the text for that page by using a list of items to include in the XML for the page.
once you get the idea, the rest becomes very easy...
and given CF ways of accessing such data with dot notation, easy peasy to us
say you have "Load Images"
in english xml it may be <LoadIMGS>Load Images</LoadIMGS>
in chinese it may be <LoadIMGS>加载图像</LoadIMGS>
or <LoadIMGS>Jiā zǎi túxiàng</LoadIMGS>
regardless, in your CFM code you would just put #variablename.LoadIMGS# in the place... i would also suggest putting in the loadimages tag the size the font should be adjusted to if not normal size. that way, when translations are too large, you can shrink that font there for that... etc.
enjoy!!!

Cleansing string / input in Coldfusion 9

I have been working with Coldfusion 9 lately (background in PHP primarily) and I am scratching my head trying to figure out how to 'clean/sanitize' input / string that is user submitted.
I want to make it HTMLSAFE, eliminate any javascript, or SQL query injection, the usual.
I am hoping I've overlooked some kind of function that already comes with CF9.
Can someone point me in the proper direction?
Well, for SQL injection, you want to use CFQUERYPARAM.
As for sanitizing the input for XSS and the like, you can use the ScriptProtect attribute in CFAPPLICATION, though I've heard that doesn't work flawlessly. You could look at Portcullis or similar 3rd-party CFCs for better script protection if you prefer.
This an addition to Kyle's suggestions not an alternative answer, but the comments panel is a bit rubbish for links.
Take a look a the ColdFusion string functions. You've got HTMLCodeFormat, HTMLEditFormat, JSStringFormat and URLEncodedFormat. All of which can help you with working with content posted from a form.
You can also try to use the regex functions to remove HTML tags, but its never a precise science. This ColdFusion based regex/html question should help there a bit.
You can also try to protect yourself from bots and known spammers using something like cfformprotect, which integrates Project Honeypot and Akismet protection amongst other tools into your forms.
You've got several options:
"Global Script Protection" Administrator setting, which applies a regular expression against post and get (i.e. FORM and URL) variables to strip out <script/>, <img/> and several other tags
Use isValid() to validate variables' data types (see my in depth answer on this one).
<cfqueryparam/>, which serves to create SQL bind parameters and validate the datatype passed to it.
That noted, if you are really trying to sanitize HTML, use Java, which ColdFusion can access natively. In particular use the OWASP AntiSamy Project, which takes an HTML fragment and whitelists what values can be part of it. This is the same approach that sites like SO and slashdot.org use to protect submissions and is a more secure approach to accepting markup content.
Sanitation of strings in coldfusion and in quite any language is very important and depends on what you want to do with the string. most mitigations are for
saving content to database (e.g. <cfqueryparam ...>)
using content to show on next page (e.g. put url-parameter in link or show url-parameter in text)
saving files and using upload filenames and content
There is always a risk if you follow the idea to prevent and reduce a string by allow basically everything in the first step and then sanitize malicious code "away" by deleting or replacing characters (blacklist approach).
The better solution is to replace strings with rereplace(...) agains regular expressions that explicitly allow only the characters needed for the scenario you use it as an easy solution, whenever this is possible. use cases are inputs for numbers, lists, email-addresses, urls, names, zip, cities, etc.
For example if you want to ask for a email-address, you could use
<cfif reFindNoCase("^[A-Z0-9._%+-]+#[A-Z0-9.-]+\.(?:[A-Z]{5})$", stringtosanitize)>...ok, clean...<cfelse>...not ok...</cfif>
(or an own regex).
For HTML-Imput or CSS-Imput I would also recommend OWASP Java HTML Sanitizer Project.

How to not transform special characters to html entities with owasp antisamy

I use Owasp Anti samy with Ebay policy file to prevent XSS attacks on my website.
I also use Hibernate search to index my objects.
When I use this code:
String html = "special word: été";
// use the Ebay configuration file
Policy policy = Policy.getInstance(xssPolicyFile.getInputStream());
AntiSamy as = new AntiSamy();
CleanResults cr = as.scan(html, policy);
// result is now : "special word: été"
result = cr.getCleanHTML();
As you can see all chars "é" has been transformed to their html entity equivalent "é"
My page is on UTF-8, so I don't need this transformation. Moreover, when I index this text with Hibernate Search, it indexes the word with html entities, so I can't find word "été" on my index.
How can I force antisamy to not transform special chars to their html entity equivalent ?
thanks
PS: an issue has been opened : http://code.google.com/p/owaspantisamy/issues/detail?id=99
I ran into the same problem this morning.
I have encapsulated antisamy in a class and I use apache StringEscapeUtil from apache common-lang to restore special characters.
CleanResults cleanResults = antiSamy.scan(taintedHtml);
cleanedHtml = cleanResults.getCleanHTML();
return StringEscapeUtils.unescapeHtml(cleanedHtml)
The result is a cleaned up HTML without the HTML escaping of special characters.
Hope this helps.
Like Mohamad said it in a comment, Antisamy has just released a new directive named : entityEncodeIntlChars
here is the detail : http://code.google.com/p/owaspantisamy/source/detail?r=240
It seems that this directive solves the problem.
After scouring the AntiSamy source code, I found no way of changing this behavior apart from modifying AntiSamy.
Check out this one: http://code.google.com/p/owaspantisamy/source/browse/#svn/trunk/dotNet/current/source/owaspantisamy/html/scan
Grab the source and notice that key classes (AntiSamyDOMScanner, CleanResults) use standard framework objects (like XmlDocument). Compile and run with the binary you compiled - so that you can see everything in a debugger - as in which of the major classes actually corrupts your data. With that in hand you'll be able to either change a few properties on major objects to make it stop or inject your own post-processing to revert the wrongdoing (say with a regexp). Latter you can expose that as additional top-level property, say one named NoMess :-)
Chances are that behavior in that respect is different between languages (there's 3 in that trunk) but the same tactics will work no matter which one you have to deal with.

Markdown and XSS

Ok, so I have been reading about markdown here on SO and elsewhere and the steps between user-input and the db are usually given as
convert markdown to html
sanitize html (w/whitelist)
insert into database
but to me it makes more sense to do the following:
sanitize markdown (remove all tags -
no exceptions)
convert to html
insert into database
Am I missing something? This seems to me to be pretty nearly xss-proof
Please see this link:
http://michelf.com/weblog/2010/markdown-and-xss/
> hello <a name="n"
> href="javascript:alert('xss')">*you*</a>
Becomes
<blockquote>
<p>hello <a name="n"
href="javascript:alert('xss')"><em>you</em></a></p>
</blockquote>
∴​ you must sanitize after converting to HTML.
There are two issues with what you've proposed:
I don't see a way for your users to be able to format posts. You took advantage of Markdown to provide nice numbered lists, for example. In the proposed no-tags-no-exceptions world, I'm not seeing how the end user would be able to do such a thing.
Considerably more important: When using Markdown as the "native" formatting language, and whitelisting the other available tags,you are limiting not just the input side of the world, but the output as well. In other words, if your display engine expects Markdown and only allows whitelisted content out, even if (God forbid) somebody gets to the database and injects some nasty malware-laden code into a bunch of posts, the actual site and its users are protected because you are sanitizing it upon display, as well.
There are some good resources on the web about output sanitization:
Sanitizing user data: Where and how to do it
Output sanitization (One of my clients, who shall remain nameless and whose affected system was not developed by me, was hit with this exact worm. We have since secured those systems, of course.)
BizTech: Best Practices: Never heard of XSS?
Well certainly removing/escaping all tags would make a markup language more secure. However the whole point of Markdown is that it allows users to include arbitrary HTML tags as well as its own forms of markup(*). When you are allowing HTML, you have to clean/whitelist the output anyway, so you might as well do it after the markdown conversion to catch everything.
*: It's a design decision I don't agree with at all, and one that I think has not proven useful at SO, but it is a design decision and not a bug.
Incidentally, step 3 should be ‘output to page’; this normally takes place at the output stage, with the database containing the raw submitted text.
insert into database
convert markdown to html
sanitize html (w/whitelist)
perl
use Text::Markdown ();
use HTML::StripScripts::Parser ();
my $hss = HTML::StripScripts::Parser->new(
{
Context => 'Document',
AllowSrc => 0,
AllowHref => 1,
AllowRelURL => 1,
AllowMailto => 1,
EscapeFiltered => 1,
},
strict_comment => 1,
strict_names => 1,
);
$hss->filter_html(Text::Markdown::markdown(shift))
convert markdown to html
sanitize html (w/whitelist)
insert into database
Here, the assumptions are
Given dangerous HTML, the sanitizer can produce safe HTML.
The definition of safe HTML will not change, so if it is safe when I insert it into the DB, it is safe when I extract it.
sanitize markdown (remove all tags - no exceptions)
convert to html
insert into database
Here the assumptions are
Given dangerous markdown, the sanitizer can produce markdown that when converted to HTML by a different program will be safe.
The definition of safe HTML will not change, so if it is safe when I insert it into the DB, it is safe when I extract it.
The markdown sanitizer has to know not just about dangerous HTML and dangerous markdown, but how the markdown->HTML converter does its job. That makes it more complex, and more likely to be wrong than the simpler unsafeHTML->safeHTML function above.
As a concrete example, "remove all tags" assumes you can identify tags, and would not work against UTF-7 attacks. There might be other encoding attacks out there that render this assumption moot, or there might be a bug that causes the markdown->HTML program to convert (full-width '<', exotic white-space characters stripped by markdown, SCRIPT) into a <script> tag.
The most secure would be:
sanitize markdown (remove all tags - no exceptions)
convert markdown to HTML
sanitize HTML
insert into a DB column marked risky
re-sanitize HTML every time you fetch that column from the DB
That way, when you update your HTML sanitizer you get protection against any newly discovered attacks. This is often inefficient, but you can get pretty good security by storing a timestamp with HTML inserted so that you can tell which might have been inserted during the time when someone knew about an attack that gets past your sanitizer.