Allow access to S3 Bucket from all EC2 instances of specific Account - amazon-web-services

Is there any way to allow all instances created by a specific AWS account access to an S3 bucket?
I would like to provide data that should be very simple for clients to download to their instances. Ideally, automatically via the post_install script option of AWS ParallelCluster.
However, it seems like this requires a lot of setup, as is described in this tutorial by AWS:
https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/s3-instance-access-bucket/
This is not feasible for me. Clients should not have to create IAM roles.
The best I came up with at the moment is allowing S3 bucket access to a specific AWS account and then working with access keys:
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=<key-id>
export AWS_SECRETE_ACCESS_KEY=<secret-key>
aws s3 cp s3://<bucket> . --recursive
Unfortunately, this is also not ideal as I would like to provide ready-to-use AWS Parallelcluster post_install scripts. These scripts should automatically download the required data on cluster startup.

Is there any way to allow all instances created by a specific AWS account access to an S3 bucket?
Yes. It's a 2 step process. In summary:
1) On your side, the bucket must trust the account id of the other accounts that will access it, and you must decide which calls you will allow.
2) On the other accounts that will access the bucket, the instances must be authorised to run AWS API calls on your bucket using IAM policies.
In more detail:
Step 1: let's work through this and break it down.
On your bucket, you'll need to configure a bucket policy like this:
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "111",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {
"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT_ID_TO_TRUST:root"
},
"Action": "s3:*",
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::YOUR_BUCKET_NAME_HERE/*"
}
]
}
You can find more examples of bucket policies in the AWS documentation here.
WARNING 1: "arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT_ID:root" will trust everything that has permissions to connect to your bucket on the other AWS account. This shouldn't be a problem for what you're trying to do, but it's best you completely understand how this policy works to prevent any accidents.
WARNING 2: Do not grant s3:* - you will need to scope down the permissions to actions such as s3:GetObject etc. There is a website to help you generate these policies here. s3:* will contain delete permissions which if used incorrectly could result in nasty surprises.
Now, once that's done, great work - that's things on your end covered.
Step 2: The other accounts that want to read the data will have to assign an instance role to the ec2 instances they launch and that role will need a policy attached to it granting access to your bucket. Those instances can then run AWS CLI commands on your bucket, provided your bucket policy authorises the call on your side and the instance policy authorises the call on their side.
The policy that needs to be attached to the instance role should look something like this:
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Action": "s3:*",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::YOUR_BUCKET_NAME_HERE/*"
}
]
}
Keep in mind, just because this policy grants s3:* it doesn't mean they can do anything on your bucket, not unless you have s3:* in your bucket policy. Actions of this policy will be limited to whatever you've scoped the permissions to in your bucket policy.
This is not feasible for me. Clients should not have to create IAM roles.
If they have an AWS account it's up to them on how they choose to access the bucket as long as you define a bucket policy that trusts their account the rest is on them. They can create an ec2 instance role and grant it permissions to your bucket, or an IAM User and grant it access to your bucket. It doesn't matter.
The best I came up with at the moment is allowing S3 bucket access to a specific AWS account and then working with access keys:
If the code will run on an ec2 instance, it's bad practice to use access keys and instead should use an ec2 instance role.
Ideally, automatically via CloudFormation on instance startup.
I think you mean via instance userdata, which you can define through CloudFormation.

You say "Clients should not have to create IAM roles". This is perfectly correct.
I presume that you are creating the instances for use by the clients. If so, then you should create an IAM Role that has access to the desired bucket.
Then, when you create an Amazon EC2 instance for your clients, associate the IAM Role to the instance. Your clients will then be able to use the AWS Command-Line Interface (CLI) to access the S3 bucket (list, upload, download, or whatever permissions you put into the IAM Role).
If you want the data to be automatically downloaded when you first create their instance, then you can add User Data script that will execute when the instance starts. This can download the files from S3 to the instance.

Related

How to give access of s3 bucket residing in Account A to different iam users from multiple aws accounts?

I am working on aws SAM project and i have a requirement of giving access to my S3 bucket to multiple iam users from unknown aws accounts but i can't make bucket publicly accessible. I want to secure my bucket as well as i want any iam user from any aws account to access the contents of my S3 bucket. Is this possible?
Below is the policy i tried and worked perfectly.
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Id": "Policy1616828964582",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "Stmt1616828940658",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {
"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/STS_Role_demo"
},
"Action": "s3:GetObject",
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::new-demo-bkt/*"
}
]
}
Above policy is for one user but i want any user from other AWS account to access my contents without making the bucket and objects public so how can i achieve this?
This might be possible using a set of Conditions on the incoming requests.
I can think of two options:
You create an IAM role that your SAM application uses even when running in other accounts
You create S3 bucket policies that allow unknown users access
If you decide to look into S3 bucket policies, I suggest using an S3 Access Point to better manage access policies.
Access points are named network endpoints that are attached to buckets
that you can use to perform S3 object operations, such as GetObject
and PutObject. Each access point has distinct permissions and network
controls that S3 applies for any request that is made through that
access point. Each access point enforces a customized access point
policy that works in conjunction with the bucket policy that is
attached to the underlying bucket.
You can use a combination of S3 Conditions to restrict access. For example, your SAM application could include specific condition keys when making S3 requests, and the bucket policy then allows access based on those conditions.
You can also apply global IAM conditions to S3 policies.
This isn't great security though, malicious actors might be able to figure out the headers and spoof requests to your bucket. As noted on some conditions such as aws:UserAgent:
This key should be used carefully. Since the aws:UserAgent value is
provided by the caller in an HTTP header, unauthorized parties can use
modified or custom browsers to provide any aws:UserAgent value that
they choose. As a result, aws:UserAgent should not be used to
prevent unauthorized parties from making direct AWS requests. You can
use it to allow only specific client applications, and only after
testing your policy.

Disable AWS S3 Management Console

Is it possible to disable AWS S3 management console for the security reasons?
We don't want anyone including root/admin users to access customer files directly from the AWS S3. We should just have programmatic access to the files stored in S3.
If this is not possible, is it possible to stop listing the directories inside the bucket for all users ?
This is a tricky one to implement, however the following should be able to fulfill the requirements.
Programmatic Access Only
You need to define exactly which actions should be denied you would not want to block access completely otherwise you might lose the ability to do anything.
If you're in AWS you should use IAM roles, and a VPC endpoint to connect to the S3 service. Both of these support the ability to control access within your S3 buckets Bucket Policy.
You would use this to deny List* actions where the source is not the VPC endpoint. You could also deny where its not a specific subset of roles.
This works for all programmatic use cases and for people who login as an IAM user from the console, however this does not deny access to the root user.
Also bear in mind for any IAM user/IAM role that they do not have access unless you explicitly give it to them via an IAM policy.
Denying Access To The Root User
There is currently only one way to deny access to the root user of an AWS account (although you should share these credentials with anyone, even within your company) as that is using a Service Control Policy.
To do this the account would need to be part of an AWS organisation (as an organisational unit). If/once it is you would create a SCP that denies access to the root principal for the specific actions that you want.
An example of this policy for you would be
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "RestrictS3ForRoot",
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": [
"s3:List*"
],
"Resource": [
"*"
],
"Condition": {
"StringLike": {
"aws:PrincipalArn": [
"arn:aws:iam::*:root"
]
}
}
}
]
}
Yes, it is possible to disable the Management Console: Don't give users a password.
When creating IAM Users, there are two ways to provide credentials:
Sign-in Credentials (for the Console)
Access Key (for API calls)
Only give users an Access Key and they won't be able to login to the console.
However, please note that when when using the Management Console, users have exactly the same permissions as using an Access Key. Thus, if they can do it in the console, then they can do it via an API call (if they have an Access Key).
If your goal is to prevent anyone from accessing customer files, then you can add a Bucket Policy with a Deny on s3:* for the bucket, where the Principal is not the customer.
Please note, however, that the Root login can remove such a policy.
If the customers really want to keep their own data private, then they would need to create their own AWS account and keep their files within it, without granting you access.

Cross account access for AWS accounts using Direct Connect

I have been working with AWS for a number of years, but I am not very strong with some of the advanced networking concepts.
So, we have multiple AWS accounts. None of them have public internet access, but we use Direct Connect for on-prem to AWS connection.
I have a S3 bucket in Account A.
I created an IAM user in Account A along with a access/secret key and granted this IAM user s3:PutObject permission to the S3 bucket.
I write a simple Python script to list the objects in this bucket from on-prem, it works, as expected.
I then execute the same Python script on an EC2 instance running in Account B, I get "botocore.exceptions.ClientError: An error occured (AccessDenied) when calling the ListObjects operation: Access Denied".
Do I need to create VPC endpoint for S3 in Account B? Does cross account IAM role come into play here?
Your situation is:
You have an Amazon S3 Bucket-A in Account-A
You have an IAM User (User-A) in Account-A
You have an Amazon EC2 instance running in Account-B
From that EC2 instance, you wish to access Bucket-A
It also appears that you have a means for the EC2 instance to access Amazon S3 endpoints to make API calls
Assuming that the instance is able to reach Amazon S3 (which appears to be true because the error message refers to permissions, which would have come from S3), there are two ways to authenticate for access to Bucket-A:
Option 1: Using the IAM User from Account-A
When making the call from the EC2 instance to Bucket-A, use the IAM credentials created in Bucket-A. It doesn't matter that the request is coming from an Amazon EC2 instance in Account-B. In fact, Amazon S3 doesn't even know that. An API call can come from anywhere on the Internet (including your home computer or mobile phone). What matters is the set of credentials provided when making the call.
If you are using the AWS Command-Line Interface (CLI) to make the call, then you can save the User-A credentials as a profile by using aws configure --profile user_a (or any name), then entering the credentials from the IAM User in Account-A. Then, access Amazon S3 with aws s3 ls --profile user_a. Using a profile like this allows you to switch between credentials.
Option 2: Using a Bucket Policy
Amazon S3 also has the ability to specify a Bucket Policy on a bucket, which can grant access to the bucket. So, if the EC2 instance is using credentials from Account-B, you can add a Bucket Policy that grants access from those Account-B credentials.
Let's say that the Amazon EC2 instance was launched with an IAM Role called role-b, then you could use a Bucket Policy like this:
{
"Version": "2008-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {
"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::<Account-B>:role/role-b"
},
"Action": "s3:GetObject",
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::bucket-a/*"
}
]
}
Disclaimer: All of the above assumes that you don't have any weird policies on your VPC Endpoints / Amazon S3 Access Points or however the VPCs are connecting with the Amazon S3 endpoints.

How to secure an S3 bucket to an Instance's Role?

Using cloudformation I have launched an EC2 instance with a role that has an S3 policy which looks like the following
{"Statement":[{"Action":"s3:*","Resource":"*","Effect":"Allow"}]}
In S3 the bucket policy is like so
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Id": "MyPolicy",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "ReadAccess",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {
"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::123456678:role/Production-WebRole-1G48DN4VC8840"
},
"Action": "s3:GetObject",
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::web-deploy/*"
}
]
}
When I login to the instance and attempt to curl any object I upload into the bucket (without acl modifications) I receive and Unauthorized 403 error.
Is this the correct way to restrict access to a bucket to only instances launched with a specific role?
The EC2 instance role is more than sufficient to put/read to any of your S3 buckets, but you need to use the instance role, which is not done automatically by curl.
You should use for example aws s3 cp <local source> s3://<bucket>/<key>, which will automatically used the instance role.
There are three ways to grant access to an object in Amazon S3:
Object ACL: Specific objects can be marked as "Public", so anyone can access them.
Bucket Policy: A policy placed on a bucket to determine what access to Allow/Deny, either publicly or to specific Users.
IAM Policy: A policy placed on a User, Group or Role, granting them access to an AWS resource such as an Amazon S3 bucket.
If any of these policies grant access, the user can access the object(s) in Amazon S3. One exception is if there is a Deny policy, which overrides an Allow policy.
Role on the Amazon EC2 instance
You have granted this role to the Amazon EC2 instance:
{"Statement":[{"Action":"s3:*","Resource":"*","Effect":"Allow"}]}
This will provide credentials to the instance that can be accessed by the AWS Command-Line Interface (CLI) or any application using the AWS SDK. They will have unlimited access to Amazon S3 unless there is also a Deny policy that otherwise restricts access.
If anything, that policy is granting too much permission. It is allowing an application on that instance to do anything it wants to your Amazon S3 storage, including deleting it all! It is better to assign least privilege, only giving permission for what the applications need to do.
Amazon S3 Bucket Policy
You have also created a Bucket Policy, which allows anything that has assumed the Production-WebRole-1G48DN4VC8840 role to retrieve the contents of the web-deploy bucket.
It doesn't matter what specific permissions the role itself has -- this policy means that merely using the role to access the web-deploy bucket will allow it to read all files. Therefore, this policy alone would be sufficient to your requirement of granting bucket access to instances using the Role -- you do not also require the policy within the role itself.
So, why can't you access the content? It is because using a straight CURL does not identify your role/user. Amazon S3 receives the request and treats it as anonymous, thereby not granting access.
Try accessing the data via the CLI or programmatically via an SDK call. For example, this CLI command would download an object:
aws s3 cp s3://web-deploy/foo.txt foo.txt
The CLI will automatically grab credentials related to your role, allowing access to the objects.

S3 giving someone permission to read and write

I've created a s3 server which contain a large number of images. I'm now trying to create a bucket policy, which fits my needs. First of all i want everybody to have read permission, so they can see the images. However i also want to give a specific website the permission to upload and delete images. this website is not stored on a amazon server? how can i achieve this? so far i've created an bucket policy which enables everybody to see the images
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "AddPerm",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": "*",
"Action": "s3:GetObject",
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket/*"
}
]
}
You can delegate access to your bucket. To do this, the other server will need AWS credentials.
If the other server were an EC2 instance that you owned then you could do this easily by launching it with an IAM role. If the other server were an EC2 instance that someone else owned, then you could delegate access to them by allowing them to assume an appropriate IAM role in your account. But for a non-EC2 server, as seems to be the case here, you will have to provide AWS credentials in some other fashion.
One way to do this is by adding an IAM user with a policy allowing s3:PutObject and s3:DeleteObject on resource "arn:aws:s3:::examplebucket/*", and then give the other server those credentials.
A better way would be to create an IAM role that has the same policy and then have the other server assume that role. The upside is that the credentials must be rotated periodically so if they are leaked then the window of exposure is smaller. To assume a role, however, the other server will still need to authenticate so will need some base IAM user credentials (unless you have some way to get credentials via identity federation). You could add a base IAM user who has permissions to assume the aforementioned role (but has no other permissions) and supply the base IAM user credentials to the other server. When using AssumeRole in this fashion you should require an external ID. You may also be able to restrict the entity assuming this role to the specific IP address(es) of the other server using a policy condition (not 100% sure if this is possible).
The Bucket Policy will work nicely to give everybody read-only access.
To give specific permissions to an application:
Create an IAM User for the application (this also creates access credentials)
Assign a policy to the IAM User that gives the desired permissions (very similar to a Bucket Policy)
The application then makes API calls to Amazon S3 using the supplied access credentials
See also: Amazon S3 Developer Guide